Pramā, according to Nyāya, is :
2024
Pramā, according to Nyāya, is :
Answer: D. Yathārtha — Concept — what makes a cognition a pramā. Nyāya first divides cognition (jñāna) into anubhava — presentative apprehension produced by an instrument of…
- A.
Smṛti
- B.
Saṃśaya
- C.
Vikalpa
- D.
Yathārtha
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Correct answer: D
Concept — what makes a cognition a pramā. Nyāya first divides cognition (jñāna) into anubhava — presentative apprehension produced by an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) — and smṛti, recollection reproduced from a stored impression. Anubhava is then divided again, and the classical definition yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā sets two conditions on a valid cognition:
it must be an anubhava, a fresh presentative apprehension and not a recollection; and
it must be yathārtha — literally yathā (in accordance with) + artha (the object) — its content agreeing with the object exactly as the object itself stands.
Correspondence with the real is therefore the defining mark: an anubhava that lacks it is ayathārtha, i.e. apramā (saṃśaya, viparyaya/bhrama, tarka). The four Nyāya pramāṇas — pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda — are simply the instruments that yield yathārthānubhava.
Application to this question. The stem asks what pramā is, i.e. the characterisation that the Nyāya definition assigns to it. Since pramā is defined as an anubhava that is yathārtha — corresponding to its object as that object really is — the answer is yathārtha. An anubhava that is ayathārtha falls on the other side of the second division and counts as apramā, while smṛti is set aside already at the first division.
Cross-check — contrast with each of the other cognitions.
Cognition | Nyāya characterisation | Relation to pramā |
|---|---|---|
Smṛti | Recollection produced by a saṃskāra, the impression left by an earlier experience | Separated from anubhava at the very first division, so it lies outside pramā by definition even when what it recalls happens to be true |
Saṃśaya | Doubt: the mind oscillates between two mutually exclusive alternatives about one locus (“post or man?”) | An anubhava that is ayathārtha — no settled correspondence with the object, hence apramā |
Vikalpa | Conceptually and verbally determined cognition; in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of perception the term goes with savikalpaka, the apprehension of an object as qualified by a name, a universal or an attribute, as against the indeterminate nirvikalpaka stage | Describes how a cognition is structured, not whether its content matches the object, so it cannot be the definiens; a savikalpaka cognition may itself turn out either pramā or apramā |
Yathārtha | Cognition whose content presents the object exactly as the object itself stands | This is pramā — the definiens yathārthānubhava |
Reverse test. Run the definition backwards: take any cognition and ask first whether it is anubhava rather than smṛti, and then whether its content matches the object as that object is. Only a cognition that passes both tests is pramā; an anubhava that fails the second is apramā (saṃśaya, viparyaya/bhrama, tarka). This two-step test both fixes the answer as yathārtha and shows why recollection is set aside at the first step, why doubt fails at the second, and why the determinate/indeterminate contrast is a fact about a cognition’s structure rather than a criterion of correspondence.