According to classical Indian School of Logic (Nyāya) the statement “fire is…
2024
According to classical Indian School of Logic (Nyāya) the statement “fire is cold because it is a substance” is fallacious because:
Answer: A. It has a non-inferentially contradicted middle term. — Concept — In Nyāya an inference (anumāna) is sound only when its hetu — the middle term, the reason offered — is free of the recognised pseudo-reasons, the…
- A.
It has a non-inferentially contradicted middle term.
- B.
The middle term has an impossible locus.
- C.
The middle term, instead of proving the presence of the major term in the minor term, proves its absence.
- D.
The middle term, instead of proving the absence of the major term in the minor term, proves its presence.
Show answer & explanation
Correct answer: A
Concept — In Nyāya an inference (anumāna) is sound only when its hetu — the middle term, the reason offered — is free of the recognised pseudo-reasons, the hetvābhāsas. One of them, bādhita (also called kālātyayāpadiṣṭa), is defined not by any flaw in the reason’s own working but by the thing to be proved: a reason is bādhita when the absence of the sādhya in the pakṣa has already been settled by a pramāṇa other than inference — normally pratyakṣa (perception), sometimes śabda (authoritative testimony). The defect therefore sits in the sādhya, not in the vyāpti.
Application — Set the given argument out in the three Nyāya terms:
Nyāya term | Value in this argument |
|---|---|
pakṣa — the subject, the minor term | fire |
sādhya — what is to be proved, the major term | coldness, i.e. non-hotness (anuṣṇatva) |
hetu — the reason offered, the middle term | being a substance (dravyatva) |
Perception delivers the heat of fire directly: anyone who approaches a flame knows by pratyakṣa, without any inference at all, that coldness is absent from this very pakṣa. The sādhya has thus been ruled out by a non-inferential means of knowledge before the reason is even examined, which is precisely the condition Annambhaṭṭa states for bādhita — “bādhito yasya sādhyābhāvaḥ pramāṇāntareṇa niścitaḥ” — and the illustration he attaches to it is this same argument, vahnir anuṣṇo dravyatvāt, “fire is not hot, because it is a substance”. The middle term is therefore contradicted non-inferentially, and the answer is that the argument has a non-inferentially contradicted middle term.
Contrast — Annambhaṭṭa’s Tarkasaṃgraha lists five hetvābhāsas, and each name marks a different place for the defect to sit: savyabhicāra (anaikāntika), where the hetu strays and occurs both with and without the sādhya; viruddha, where the hetu is pervaded by the contradictory of the sādhya; satpratipakṣa, where an equally strong counter-reason proves the opposite; asiddha, where the hetu, its locus, or its pervasion is itself unestablished; and bādhita, as defined above. Each description offered in this question points at one of them:
Description offered | Fallacy it names | How it bears on this argument |
|---|---|---|
Middle term contradicted non-inferentially | bādhita / kālātyayāpadiṣṭa | It does fit: perception has already established the absence of coldness in fire, so the sādhya is barred by a pramāṇa other than anumāna. |
Middle term with an impossible locus | āśrayāsiddha, a variety of asiddha | This requires an unreal pakṣa, such as a sky-lotus, so that the reason has no substratum to reside in. Fire is a perfectly real locus, and substancehood genuinely belongs to it. |
Middle term proves the major term’s absence in the minor term where its presence was claimed | viruddha | This requires the hetu to be pervaded by the negation of the sādhya. Substancehood is not pervaded by hotness — water is a substance and is cold — so it establishes nothing contrary here. |
Middle term proves the major term’s presence in the minor term where its absence was claimed | viruddha, stated for a negative sādhya | Same requirement, read the other way round, and it fails for the same reason: substancehood is not invariably concomitant with heat, so it does not establish the affirmation either. |
Cross-check — Substancehood does stray: it is found in cold things (water) and in hot things (fire) alike, so a student may be tempted to call the argument savyabhicāra. That defect is real, but savyabhicāra is not among the descriptions offered, and the classical texts file this exact example under bādhita because a perceptual contradiction of the sādhya is the decisive and prior objection — once perception has settled that fire is hot, no reason whatever can prove it cold. Test the reading once more against the definition: is the absence of the sādhya (coldness) in the pakṣa (fire) known by a pramāṇa other than inference? Yes, by perception. The description that matches is the non-inferentially contradicted middle term.