"Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. There is smoke in Mr Verma's chamber.…

2020

"Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.

There is smoke in Mr Verma's chamber.

There must be fire in Mr Verma's chamber."

In accordance with Indian logic, this is an example of

  1. A.

    Pratyaksha pramana (Perception)

  2. B.

    Upamana (Comparison)

  3. C.

    Hetvabhasa (Fallacy)

  4. D.

    Vyapti (Invariable relations)

Show answer & explanation

Correct answer: D

Concept

Nyaya epistemology recognises four valid means of knowledge (pramanas): Pratyaksha (perception), Anumana (inference), Upamana (comparison), and Shabda (verbal testimony). Anumana works through Vyapti — the invariable, unconditional concomitance between a hetu (reason, the observed mark) and a sadhya (the property being inferred): wherever the hetu occurs, the sadhya invariably occurs too. It is this universal ‘wherever X, then Y’ link that licenses inferring an unobserved fact from an observed one.

Application

The opening line, ‘Wherever there is smoke, there is fire,’ states exactly this kind of universal, invariable relation between smoke (the hetu) and fire (the sadhya) — smoke never occurs without fire. The next line, ‘There is smoke in Mr Verma’s chamber,’ observes the hetu in a particular case, and the conclusion, ‘There must be fire in Mr Verma’s chamber,’ follows only because that smoke-fire relation was already fixed as universal and exceptionless. The whole passage is therefore built on, and illustrates, the Vyapti between smoke and fire.

Cross-check / Contrast

  • Pratyaksha (perception) is knowledge gained directly through the senses when the object itself is present before them; fire in the chamber is never directly sensed here, only inferred, so this label does not fit.

  • Upamana (comparison) is knowledge gained by recognising an unfamiliar object through its likeness to something already known (as when an unfamiliar animal is identified because it resembles a familiar one); the passage draws no such comparison between two similar objects.

  • Hetvabhasa (fallacy) names a reason that only appears to fix a universal connection but actually fails to hold — a defective basis for inference; the smoke-fire relation used here is a standard, sound basis for inference, not a flawed one, so this label is inappropriate.

Hence the argument rests on Vyapti, the invariable relation between smoke and fire that allows the conclusion about fire in the chamber to be drawn.

Explore the full course: Nta Ugc Net Paper 1