According to Nyaya logic, which of the following statements is fallacious…
2024
According to Nyaya logic, which of the following statements is fallacious because it involves a non-inferentially contradicted middle term?
Answer: B. Fire is cold because it is a substance — Concept — In Nyaya, an inference (anumana) is sound only when the middle term (hetu, the reason) genuinely establishes the probandum (sadhya) in the subject…
- A.
The hill has fire because it is knowable
- B.
Fire is cold because it is a substance
- C.
All things are non-eternal because they are knowable
- D.
Sound is eternal because it is audible
Show answer & explanation
Correct answer: B
Concept — In Nyaya, an inference (anumana) is sound only when the middle term (hetu, the reason) genuinely establishes the probandum (sadhya) in the subject (paksha). A reason that looks like a good probans but is defective is a hetvabhasa. Nyaya counts five kinds:
Savyabhichara (anaikantika) — the middle strays outside the probandum.
Viruddha — the middle proves the very opposite.
Satpratipaksha — the middle is met by an equally strong opposing inference.
Asiddha — the middle is itself unproved.
Badhita (also called kalatita) — the probandum is already ruled out by a pramana other than inference.
The test for badhita — Ask one question: is the conclusion set aside by a NON-inferential source of knowledge, that is, by perception, comparison or testimony rather than by a rival inference? If direct experience already establishes the contrary, the middle term is badhita however well formed the argument looks. This is what separates badhita from satpratipaksha, where the opposition itself comes from another inference.
Application
Take the statement 'Fire is cold because it is a substance' (vahnih anushnah dravyatvat). Here paksha = fire, sadhya = coldness, hetu = substancehood.
For the inference to run, the pervasion (vyapti) 'whatever is a substance is cold' would have to hold.
But the hotness of fire is given directly in tactile perception (pratyaksha): every contact with fire establishes ushnatva, and no inference is needed to know it.
Perception is a pramana other than inference. The sadhya 'coldness in fire' therefore stands annulled before the inference can even operate.
So the middle term is contradicted non-inferentially. This is badhita (kalatita) hetvabhasa, exactly the defect the question names.
Cross-check: how the other statements differ
Statement | Middle term (hetu) | Standing in Nyaya |
|---|---|---|
The hill has fire because it is knowable | knowability (prameyatva) | Savyabhichara of the sadharana kind: knowability sits in fiery loci such as a kitchen and in fireless loci such as a lake, so the middle strays. The defect is internal to the inference. |
Fire is cold because it is a substance | substancehood (dravyatva) | Badhita: coldness in fire is annulled by perception, a pramana other than inference. |
All things are non-eternal because they are knowable | knowability (prameyatva) | Savyabhichara of the anupasamhari kind: the subject already takes in everything whatever, so no instance is left outside it to serve as an example. The defect is internal to the inference. |
Sound is eternal because it is audible | audibility (shravanatva) | Satpratipaksha: it is met by the counter-inference 'sound is non-eternal because it is produced'. Some manuals file the same example under asadharana anaikantika, since audibility rests in sound alone. Either way the opposition is inferential. |
Only one of the four is set aside by a non-inferential pramana: 'Fire is cold because it is a substance', whose conclusion perception itself refutes. The other three fail for reasons internal to inference, whether a straying middle or a counter-inference. Hence the answer is 'Fire is cold because it is a substance'.